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Abstract   Individual transferable quota (ITQ) regulation relies on a decentralized
market mechanism and a single price to allocate access to a stock of fish. The result-
ing allocation will not be fully efficient if the stock being allocated is heterogeneous
or if there are potential gains from centralized coordination of harvesting effort. If
stocks are heterogeneous in their density, location, or unit value during the season,
harvesters governed by an ITQ policy will not be indifferent to when or where they
exercise their quotas. Stocks that are relatively dense and/or close to port will be
preferred to those less dense or more remote. Because an ITQ policy assigns the
same opportunity cost for each unit harvested, individual harvesters have an incen-
tive to compete for higher-valued units, and such competition may dissipate part of
the fishery’s potential rent. A similar phenomenon arises when stock densities vary
in an unknown way over space or time, so harvesters must engage in costly search.
Individual harvesters governed by an ITQ policy still face a collective action prob-
lem which limits the incentive to share information on stock locations. This can lead
to redundant search effort. We demonstrate that both sources of inefficiency can be
eliminated either by defining ITQ rights more precisely or by an agreement among
harvesters to coordinate their effort. We develop models that illustrate these effects
and identify the factors that determine their likely size. Anecdotal evidence on prac-
tices adopted by fishery cooperatives is presented to illustrate the practical
relevance of the issues we raise.
Key words   ITQ fishery, cooperative, search, game theory, property rights.
JEL Classification Codes   Q22, D23, K11.
Introduction
The race to fish is an allegory for rent-seeking economic behavior by fishermen,
such as overinvesting in physical capital to out-race one’s opponents in the quest for
high-valued harvest. It is often claimed that by assigning secure individual rights to
particular units of harvest, an individual transferable quota (ITQ) will end the race
to fish which plagues open access fisheries. Boyce (1992) has argued that the market
price for ITQs will not fully reflect production externalities, and hence fishermen
will not internalize these effects in their effort decisions. Thus, he argues that ITQs
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will not fully eliminate cost-increasing behavior when stock and/or congestion ex-
ternalities are present and implicitly indicates that centralized coordination could
lead to efficiency gains.
We advance this argument along two dimensions. First, we argue that even with
homogeneous fishermen, no stock externalities, and no congestion externalities,
property rights assigned to harvest (ITQs) may not secure all rents in a fishery,
though they are unambiguously superior to an open access situation. The outcome,
we argue, depends on whether the stock in question is composed of economically
homogeneous, or heterogeneous, components. We find that economically heteroge-
neous fisheries managed with ITQs can generally benefit from a more refined
assignment of property rights or from a degree of centralized coordination that ITQ
policies alone do not achieve. We then describe the magnitude of that benefit as a
function of bioeconomic characteristics and offer a simple rule of thumb indicating
whether the benefits from such ITQ refinements are likely to be large or small. Sec-
ond, we note that uncertainty over the locations of stocks induces a collective action
problem that can lead to inefficient search in an ITQ fishery. Once again, this ineffi-
ciency can be eliminated either by delineating harvest rights more precisely or by
coordinating effort. We formulate a simple search model to illustrate these gains.1
Other researchers have addressed similar questions. Boyce (1992) provides an
elegant analysis of within-season effort decisions, comparing the social planner’s
optimum to the outcome with ITQ regulation in a case where each firm’s effort in-
terferes with others in the industry. The interference caused by one firm’s fishing
effort may be of two sorts: (i) it may congest the fishing grounds, or (ii) the firm’s
catch may raise the catch costs of others by reducing the stock. Boyce finds that an
ITQ policy, which imposes a scarcity price on each unit of the stock, necessarily im-
proves on open access. He concludes that it does not cause firms to internalize the
costs caused by their mutual interference, however, and thus is not fully efficient
when congestion is present. This point was also noted by Clark (1980). Clark and
Boyce disagree over whether an ITQ policy will be fully efficient at allocating
within-season effort when congestion effects are absent, but catch costs still depend
on stock. Wilson (1990) addresses the phenomenon of search in fisheries where the
movements of stocks are generally unknown. He examines incentives for the cre-
ation, sharing, and distortion of knowledge on stock locations in rule of capture
fisheries and points out the obvious tendency toward under-provision of knowledge
in the absence of some coordinating institution. He also describes the circumstances
under which precise, timely information on stock locations will be particularly valu-
able. He does not link his analysis to specific management regimes, however.
A few preliminary remarks on the way we characterize competition for hetero-
geneous stocks are in order. The context for our analysis is a static, one-shot game.
Each harvester is assigned a number of ITQ units and chooses how to allocate this
quota to various fishing dates and portions of the stock. To maintain clarity, we
model the fishermen as having homogeneous harvest costs, in which case transfer-
ability is not required for our results to obtain. Allowing for heterogeneous costs
would alter our results only quantitatively because trade would take place to satisfy
the equi-marginal principle. Thus, this extension would not alter the substance of
our conclusions. We introduce resource heterogeneity by partitioning the stock into
sub-stocks, each of which contains members that have identical economic value.
Those who are first to fish a particular sub-stock experience higher unit profits than
those who come later, and the resulting competition to be first tends to exhaust the
1 We do not address the costs of reaching agreement on coordinated actions. On this question, see
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inframarginal rents on superior sub-stocks. We focus on symmetric Nash equilibria,
which is natural since we assume all harvesters are equally efficient and receive
identical quota allocations. Harvesters are identical so there is no trade in harvest
quotas, though quota allocations still have a positive value. Unit values for sub-
stocks are assumed to vary over time within a single season. This would arise if
sub-stocks migrate over the fishing grounds causing variations in harvest costs, if
sub-stocks become more or less dense (easy to find) at different times during the
fishing season, if the unit value of unharvested individuals grows during the season;
e.g., due to seasonal variations in quality, or if the price of harvested fish varies over
the season. Within-season discounting is ignored for analytical convenience.
Competition for a Heterogeneous Stock
A stock of fish is composed of N sub-stocks, indexed n = 1, 2, ..., N, each of which
contains one unit of stock before fishing begins. While the stock is biologically ho-
mogeneous, different members of the stock may have different economic value
depending on their location and other factors. We define a sub-stock as a collection
of individual fish that all return the same profit from harvest. A total of J fishermen
compete in harvest. The exogenously determined total allowable catch (TAC) is k,
where k < N. Thus k is the maximum number of sub-stocks that can be caught in
full, given the TAC.
Harvest profitability may vary across sub-stocks at a point in time, and across
time for a given sub-stock. For sub-stock n, the profit from harvesting a unit on date
s when the sub-stock has not been previously fished is Vn(s). There is a penalty for
not being the first to harvest any sub-stock, however. This penalty could arise from
lower stock densities, and hence higher costs, for those who do not deploy their gear
first. Alternatively, a late arriver might find that a given sub-stock has been entirely
harvested by others, forcing the individual to divert effort elsewhere. Marginal
profit from harvesting sub-stock, n, at date s′, when others fished the same stock at
an earlier date, s, is:
Vs Ls s nn () ( ) , − ′ − (1)
where Ln is continuous and Ln(s′ – s) > 0 for s′ > s and Ln(s′ – s) = 0 for s′ ≤ s. Har-
vest dates are constrained by the length of the fishing season, τ, hence s ∈ [0,τ]. We
adopt the following assumptions:
Assumption 1.  All agents have full, symmetric information; there is no uncertainty.
Assumption 2.  Vn(s) is continuous over the interval [0, τ].
Assumption 3.  Vn(s) attains a positive maximum at the unique date sn
* ∈ (0,τ], and
these maxima are different for each sub-stock.
Let the indexing for n be chosen so that sub-stocks are ordered in decreasing order
of the maximal profit attainable from harvesting them; i.e., V(s1
*) ≥ V2(s2
*) ≥ … ≥
VN(sN
*), where sn
* is defined in Assumption 3. We require one final assumption guar-
anteeing that it is not optimal to immediately harvest all sub-stocks at the opening of
the season and that the kth sub-stock is strictly more profitable (at its maximum) than
the k + 1st.
Assumption 4.  VV s V s nk k k k ′ ++ <> () ( ) ( ) ** 0 11  for all n′ < k.Costello and Deacon 350
Case 1: Full Assignment of Property Rights
We characterize a full assignment of property rights as an allocation in which a
single maximizing agent is given the right to harvest a single sub-stock. If J ≤ k,
each fisherman is assigned the exclusive right to harvest all of one or more sub-
stocks. If J > k, the J fishermen are combined into k competitive firms, and each
firm is assigned the exclusive right to harvest one sub-stock. If firm j′ is assigned
the right to harvest sub-stock n′, its strategy variable is tj′n′, the date on which it har-
vests its assigned stock.
Proposition 1.  A profile of strategies in which the k firms or J fishermen harvest
each sub-stock entirely at date sn
* = argmax{Vn(s)} is a Nash equilibrium. That is,
firm j’s best response is the strategy tjn = sn
* for the stock it harvests. If the regulator
assigns quota allocations only for stocks n = 1, ..., k, this Nash equilibrium maxi-
mizes the sum of profits (rents) from harvesting a TAC equal to k.
Proof.  Suppose firm j′ is allocated the right to harvest sub-stock n′. The profit firm
j′ realizes from its choice of tj′n′ is independent of the choices of other firms, since j′
owns the entire allocation for this sub-stock. Therefore, whatever choices the other
firms may make, j′ can do no better than to harvest n′ at date  sn′
* .
When each firm plays a best response, and assuming the regulator has assigned
quotas only for the first k stocks, the result is efficient in the sense of Proposition 1.
This full assignment outcome depends on each firm receiving an allocation for a
single, economically homogeneous stock and on the regulator’s choice of stocks n = 1,
..., k as targets for harvest. If an ITQ regime does not meet these conditions, the re-
sult will not be efficient, as we demonstrate next.
Case 2: Incomplete Assignment of Property Rights
In this case, each fisherman or firm has the right to catch Q fish in total, but is not
assigned rights to members of specific sub-stocks. This is the sense in which prop-
erty rights are incomplete. If more than 1 harvester targets the same sub-stock, those
who arrive later in time are penalized according to equation (1). This penalty may be
due to diminished abundance and hence higher harvest costs, or it may arise from
other sources. As before, we assume a TAC equal to k.
Because sub-stocks are not exclusively assigned to fishermen, the choice of
which sub-stocks to harvest is now part of each fisherman’s strategy. Accordingly,
an individual fisherman’s strategy now consists of a set of harvest dates and quota
allocations for each sub-stock. Harvester j’s announcement for stock n is denoted
{αjn, tjn}, where αjn denotes the quota share that j allocates to stock n and tjn denotes
the date at which j will harvest it. As before, harvest dates are constrained by the
length of the season, hence tjn ∈ [0, τ]. Fisherman j’s quota allocations to individual
sub-stocks are constrained by  α jn n
N = ∑ = 1 1 . Assumptions 1-4 continue to hold.
The profit per fish that j receives from playing strategy {αjn, tjn} depends on the
strategies of all others. This per-fish payoff is expressed as follows:
{ , }; { , }, αα jn jn j n j n
jn
tt j j ′′ ′ ≠ [] = ∏ (2)
Vt t t j jn N
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Because Ln(0) = 0 and Ln(tjn – tj′n) > 0 for tjn – tj′n > 0, there is a penalty for being late
to the fishing grounds for any sub-stock. Logically, the size of the penalty j experi-
ences for being late to sub-stock n should depend on the total catch of firms that
harvest sub-stock n before j does. To obtain analytical solutions, we require no fur-
ther assumptions on the structure of Ln(·) beyond the fact that the preceding
condition holds for any positive catch by other firms.
Equation (2) gives per-fish profits from sub-stock n = 1, ..., N as a function of
the timing of fishing effort. In cases where the sum of announced catches for sub-
stock n is no greater than 1, which is the size of sub-stock n, each firm achieves its
announced share, and profits are computed by multiplying the αjn by profit per fish.
In cases where the announced catches of individual firms exceed 1, the announced
catches of all firms are scaled down proportionately to equal the sub-stock’s size,
and profits are again found by multiplying catch by profit per fish. In such cases, the
harvesters whose quotas were scaled down will necessarily catch fewer than Q fish
over the season, so total catch will be less than the TAC and some fish will escape.
This does not happen in the Nash equilibrium we examine shortly, however.
Proposition 2.  The profile of strategies that was a Nash equilibrium under full assign-
ment of property rights is not, in general, a Nash equilibrium in the present context.
Proof.  In the full assignment case, suppose fisherman 1 was assigned the right to
catch sub-stock 1 and fisherman 2 was assigned the right to catch sub-stock 2. From
Proposition 1, firm 1 would choose date t11 = s1
* and firm 2 would choose t22 = s2
*.
Given our indexing convention and Assumption 3, we know V(s1
*) > V(s2
*). Fisher-
man 2’s best response when rights are incompletely assigned is to fish for sub-stock
1 at date s1
* – ε for small ε. By Assumption 2, this guarantees a profit increase for
fisherman 2 for ε suitably small. Therefore, the strategies that resulted in a Nash
equilibrium under full assignment of property rights are not best responses in the
present context.
Proposition 2 points out that when stocks are heterogeneous in value, fishermen
will not be content to harvest all sub-stocks at dates that are efficient. Anyone har-
vesting a lower-valued stock could gain by switching effort to a higher-valued stock
and harvesting earlier than is optimal. Under this incomplete assignment of fishing
rights, a race to catch the ‘best fish’ persists. As we point out later, this phenomenon
is a consequence of heterogeneity in the maximal value of sub-stocks. Absent such
heterogeneity, the optimal harvest dates described in Proposition 1 still constitute a
Nash equilibrium profile of strategies.
Proposition 3.  Under Assumptions 1-4, a symmetric strategy profile is a Nash equi-
librium if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. Each fisherman announces harvest shares of Q/k(=1/J) for stocks n = 1, ..., k;
2. Each fisherman announces a harvest date of sk
* = argmax{Vk(s)} for sub-stock k;
3. Each fisherman announces the unique harvest date  ˆ { ( ( ))} * sV V s nn k k = − min 1  for sub-
stocks n < k.
The Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 3 has several policy-relevant
features. First, only the sub-stocks with greatest maximal profit are harvested. Sec-
ond, noting that sub-stock n may attain a given level of profit on several dates, part
3 of Proposition 3 indicates that the Nash equilibrium harvest date in such cases is
the earliest of these dates. Third, combining the preceding result with Assumption 4
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make use of this fact in the proof that follows. Finally, the Nash equilibrium profit
earned from harvesting each sub-stock equals the maximal profit from harvesting
the least profitable sub-stock, Vk(sk
*).
Proof.  Assume all firms announce dates and quantities described in parts 1-3. We
consider whether firm j could do better by choosing a different strategy given the
play of others.
First, could j gain by announcing a positive harvest quantity and any harvest
date for some sub-stock  ˜ ? nk >  Because j’s allocation is exactly exhausted in the
original strategy profile, this deviation would cause an equal reduction in j’s catch
for some sub-stock n ≤ k. This switch would necessarily reduce j’s profit because the
maximal profit j can earn from any sub-stock  ˜ nk >  is necessarily lower than the
profit j can earn from harvesting sub-stock k at date sk
* and sub-stocks n = 1, ..., k – 1
at dates  ˆ . sn  Accordingly, this deviation cannot be part of a best response.
Second, consider a deviation in j’s announced date for some sub-stock n′ < k.
Announcing an earlier date would reduce j’s profit per fish because Vn′ is upward sloping
when condition 3 is satisfied. Announcing a later date, ts jn n ′′ > ˆ , would cause a loss of
Lt s nj n n ′′ ′ − ( ˆ ) in profit per fish. Regarding sub-stock k, announcing a harvest date either
earlier or later than sk
* would cause a loss since sk
* maximizes profit per fish. The harvest
dates specified in parts 2 and 3 of Proposition 3 are, therefore, best responses.
Finally, given the announced dates  ˆ sn and sk
*, can j gain by deviating from har-
vests of Q/k for sub-stocks 1, …, k? In the allocation satisfying conditions 1-3, j is
earning Vk(sk
*) per fish for stocks n = 1, …, k. Announcing a catch larger than Q/k for
some stock n′ < k would require that j announce a commensurately smaller catch for
some other stock. Since all stocks yield the same profit per fish, this cannot yield a
gain in profit, so announcing Q/k for each sub-stock harvested is a best response.
A noteworthy caveat is that the Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 3 re-
lies on an assumption of no fixed costs of harvesting a sub-stock. With a fixed cost
for fishing a given sub-stock, the symmetric strategy profile is no longer a Nash
equilibrium because an individual fisherman could do better by devoting his/her en-
tire quota allocation to a smaller number (possibly 1) of sub-stocks, thus reducing
fixed costs. However, even in this case Proposition 2 obtains, and special cases exist
where the exact harvest dates and quantities identified in Proposition 3 still hold.2
Most importantly, we can show that a version of our principal qualitative result still
holds; there exists no common level of fixed costs for which an undifferentiated ITQ
preserves all rents.
Caveats notwithstanding, Proposition 3 described the salient features of one
Nash equilibrium in this setting, but did not rule out the possibility of other Nash
equilibria. In fact, in most cases it can be shown that multiple Nash equilibria exist.
However, we can show that of all the possible Nash equilibria in this problem, the
one described in Proposition 3 returns maximal profit. This is a powerful result be-
cause it will ultimately allow us to place an upper bound on the fishery rents that are
secured under an incomplete assignment of rights (i.e., an ITQ), and thus to place a
lower bound on potential gains from fully assigning property rights in the fishery.
To prove this result requires the following lemma:
Lemma 1.  A Nash equilibrium requires that all harvested sub-stocks return equal
profit.
2 For example, suppose J = 2k, so there are two fishermen for each harvestable sub-stock. In this in-
stance, a pure strategy profile in which each fisherman devotes his/her entire quota allocation to a single
sub-stock (and each sub-stock is targeted by exactly two fishermen) is a Nash equilibrium if it satisfies
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Proof. We will proceed by contradiction. Assume a set of strategies yields a Nash
equilibrium. Suppose that some sub-stock, n′, returns higher profit in equilibrium
than the other harvested sub-stocks. Any agent spending less than his full allocation
of harvest on sub-stock n′ will benefit from reallocating towards sub-stock n′ at a
slightly earlier time, thus ensuring his full capture of the profitable stock. Thus, the
assumed strategies cannot be a Nash equilibrium, and have proven the result by con-
tradiction.
This lemma allows us to show that while our previously described Nash equilib-
rium is not unique, it returns maximal profit.
Corollary 1.  Of all the possible Nash equilibria, the one characterized in Proposi-
tion 3 returns maximal profit.
Proof. The equilibrium in Proposition 3 returns Vk(sk
*) for each harvested sub-stock.
First, observe that by Lemma 1 and the fact that the total quota is k sub-stocks, there
exists no Nash equilibrium that returns > Vk(sk
*) for each harvested stock. If the re-
turn was > Vk(sk
*), the full quota would not be used [because Vk(sk
*) is the maximal
profit for the kth sub-stock], and any individual could increase his profit by harvest-
ing his full quota at an earlier date. Second, observe (again by Lemma 1) that any
Nash equilibrium that returns < Vk(sk
*) per harvested stock would necessarily return
lower aggregate rents than does the Nash equilibrium described in Proposition 3.
This follows directly from the fact that in both cases the entire allocation (k sub-
stocks) is harvested.
Figure 1 illustrates an example with N = 4 sub-stocks, each with a different time
profile of profitability and different optimal harvest date, and a quota of k = 3. If




*, yielding profits of V1(s1
*), V2(s2
*), and V3(s3
*). When rights are
not fully assigned, Corollary 1 shows that the rent-maximizing Nash equilibrium
(see Proposition 3) implies that each sub-stock is harvested on the date when its
profit equals the maximum profit from harvesting the kth least profitable sub-stock.
These times are given by  ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ss s 12 3 and  respectively. The least profitable sub-stock,
sub-stock 4, is left unharvested in this example.
A useful result can be established for the special case where the first k stocks
each attain the same maximal profit. Importantly, the profit profiles need not be
identical, nor do they need to attain their maxima on the same date. This special
case is defined below:
Definition 1.  Sub-stocks {1, 2, ..., k} are said to have equa-maximal-profit if V1(s1
*)
= V2(s2
*) = … = Vk(sk
*).
Corollary 2.  Under Assumptions 1-4, the Nash equilibrium strategy profile in
Proposition 3 maximizes profits from harvesting a TAC of k units if and only if sub-
stocks {1, 2, ..., k} have equa-maximal-profit.
Proof.  Sufficiency is a direct consequence of Proposition 3. To prove necessity,
suppose the condition did not hold. By the ordering of profits, that would imply
V1(s1
*) > Vk(sk
*). According to Proposition 3, sub-stock 1 would be harvested at time
ˆ , * ss 11 <  yielding a payoff lower than that achieved under complete property rights
assignment.
Proposition 3 and Corollary 2 suggest that total rent could go from a large posi-
tive value, as when the sub-stocks harvested have identical maximal profits, to near
zero, as when Vk(sk
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sub-stock k. The degree of systemic rent dissipation under an incomplete assignment
of rights, therefore, hinges critically upon the heterogeneity of maximal profits
across sub-stocks.
What dissipates rents when property rights are imperfectly assigned is competi-
tion for the highest valued sub-stocks. In our model, this competition takes the form
of premature harvest, which necessarily reduces profitability. In other contexts, the
actions firms take may be different. For example, a firm might deploy set nets or
traps around a highly profitable site even if the gear catches nothing, so long as it
forestalls catch by others. Because these actions can only diminish the net value of
the harvest, they are socially wasteful. A full assignment of rights; i.e., separate
catch quotas for all sub-stocks that have different maximal values, would eliminate
this waste.
If a complete delineation of rights is infeasible, the same end might be reached
by augmenting a simple ITQ regime with a set of formal rules or informal conven-
tions that coordinate effort in order to reduce wasteful competition. In terms of
figure 1, a set of separate season openings for each sub-stock, with sub-stock 1
opening on s1
* and sub-stock 2 opening on s2
*, would accomplish this.3 If the time
profiles of profitability are driven by spatial movements, as when sub-stocks mi-
Figure 1.  Incomplete Assignment of Harvest Rights
3 Such a rule would raise profits for the affected sub-stocks relative to other sub-stocks, creating an in-
centive for harvesters to find other ways to compete for them. To avoid inefficiency, the rule must also
ration access to the sub-stocks that are rendered more valuable.Enhancing ITQ Efficiency 355
grate toward ports, rules that prohibit fishing in specified locations would accom-
plish the same end. In a later section we examine evidence that this kind of
coordination is often attempted in actual fisheries.
Gains from More Efficient Search
The preceding section showed that rent capture in an ITQ fishery can be enhanced
by defining rights precisely in cases where stocks are economically heterogeneous.
There may also be efficiency gains from defining rights precisely in cases where
sub-stocks are economically identical. The key requirement is that the locations of
sub-stocks are uncertain, so harvesters must search to find them. Under a simple
ITQ policy, harvesters will generally engage in duplicative search, which reduces
rents. When this occurs, gains can be realized by assigning rights to harvest in spe-
cific areas, which amounts to a more complete assignment of rights.
Suppose that at the beginning of the fishing season the N sub-stocks of fish are
distributed across space, where sub-stock n is located at a unique known location,
and each sub-stock contains one unit of fish. Fish within sub-stocks are assumed to
congregate with one another, they do not appreciably change location during the
fishing season, and no two sub-stocks occupy the same location. Fisherman j must exert
one unit of effort to visit a location. If it contains a sub-stock, j catches it entirely; if the
location visited is depleted, j catches nothing and must move to another location to
fill his quota. The total cost of fishing is cE, where c is a constant and E is the units
of effort exerted in a season. What total profit will result from a TAC of k < N in this
spatial fishery, and how does this profit depend on information sharing? To simplify,
we assume that sub-stocks all have the same unit value, normalized here to 1. The
industry’s total profit from harvesting k sub-stocks is then:
Ψ() . kk c E = − (3)
Full Assignment of Rights
We define a full assignment of rights in the present context as one in which each
fisherman is assigned a unique set of fishing locations. With search locations as-
signed in this way, there will be no wasted or redundant effort because each
fisherman knows whether or not a specific location assigned to him has been fished
in the past and, therefore, knows the exact location of each remaining sub-stock in
his assigned area. To obtain a total harvest of k therefore requires exactly E* = k
units of effort, yielding profit:
Ψ*() ( ) . kk c k kc = − = − 1 (4)
No Spatial Assignment
What happens when individual fishermen are assigned rights to harvest, but these
rights are not spatially explicit? A fisherman visiting a particular location does not
know whether or not it has already been searched (and thus depleted) by others. If
all fishermen visit several sites sequentially during the season, the first units of ef-
fort will be relatively productive because few sites will have been visited earlier.
Subsequent effort becomes less efficient as sites are depleted, however, increasingCostello and Deacon 356
(in expectation) redundant effort on patches already depleted. This result is formal-
ized below:
Proposition 4.  Without spatial harvest assignments, the profit from an expected





















where N is the number of locations, each containing one sub-stock of population 1
prior to harvest.
Proof.  Suppose n locations have already been visited and thus depleted. The prob-
ability that the next unit of effort deployed will visit an undepleted location is [(N –
n)/N] and the probability that it will visit a site already depleted is n/N. Let Am be
the expected number of locations depleted after m units of effort have been de-
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This recursive relation can be solved, yielding the following closed-form expression
for the expected harvest with E units of effort:
Expected Harvest  =  NN E 11 1 1 −− []
+ (/ ) . (7)
Setting equation (7) equal to k, and solving for E gives the desired expression—the
profit from an expected total harvest of k.
Marginal harvest cost is constant (in k) with full assignment of rights, while it is
increasing (in k) in the absence of spatial rights. The consequence of Proposition 4
is that increasing amounts of harvest have increasingly larger marginal costs when
rights are not fully assigned, due to the redundancy of effort. This is illustrated in
figure 2, which shows total harvest cost as a function of the quota for both cases
(spatial rights and no spatial rights), assuming a total of N = 100 sub-stocks and
marginal cost c = 1. Comparing equation (4) to equation (5), profit is always larger
under the full assignment of rights and the wedge between the two is increasing in
the quota, k. Assigning rights to spatial harvest locations captures the fishery’s en-
tire rent because no effort is redundant. If spatially assigned rights are infeasible, the
same end could be achieved by an industry agreement to share information on which
locations have been searched.
Anecdotal Evidence
The use of ITQ instruments to regulate fisheries has spread around the globe over
the last 20 years due to dissatisfaction with earlier management regimes on both
economic and ecological grounds. Overall, the experience has been positive. En-
hanced rents are directly evident in positive prices for quota allocations and higher
unit values for final products. Indirect evidence of improved efficiency is apparentEnhancing ITQ Efficiency 357
in improved catch per unit effort and longer fishing seasons. Without denying these
successes, our analysis indicates that even greater rent capture may be possible if an
ITQ policy adopts finer definitions of rights. We have not, however, provided any
evidence that the phenomena we examine are significant in practice, and we cannot
point to any actual ITQ policies that formally delineate rights so precisely.
If the problems we describe are significant, we would expect to see ITQ partici-
pants, or possibly regulators, taking steps to eliminate them. Examples would be
formal restrictions in an ITQ fishery to allocate effort spatially or temporally, or co-
operative agreements among harvesters that achieve the same ends by coordinating
the effort. In this section, we present some suggestive evidence on this point. The
examples we report involve cooperatives, whether formally sanctioned or not, that
reside within a larger fishery management structure. The larger structure typically
defines rules of the game; e.g., quota or effort allocations for individuals or groups,
which typically preserve some rents in the fishery. Subject to those constraints, the
cooperative then serves as a coordinating body that increases the efficiency of har-
vest, thus increasing profits to its members. The following examples deal both with
coordinating effort to avoid unproductive competition and with the issue of redun-
dant search.
Chignik Salmon Cooperative. Until 2002 the sockeye salmon harvest in the Chignik
region of Alaska on the southern side of the Alaskan Peninsula was regulated by
limited entry with an annual, fishery-wide quota. The harvest technology is purse
seine, and there are about 100 active permits (which are transferable) in any given
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year. These institutions apparently preserve some rents because about 20 permits
change hands in a typical year, at a price of roughly $200,000 (Alaska Board of
Fisheries 2003). In 2002 a group of Chignik fishermen petitioned the Alaska Board
of Fisheries to form a cooperative, into which 77 of the 100 permit holders elected.
The remaining 23 fishermen maintained their independent status. The Board of Fish-
eries divided the total quota between these two groups, 69% to the coop and 31% to
the independent holders, and the two groups fished separate openings (Knapp and
Hill 2003). The cooperative structured its harvest and payoffs as follows: 22 of the
77 members were paid to catch the coop’s entire quota, while 55 did not fish but
shared in the revenues from catch according to a predetermined formula.4 During its
short life, the coop coordinated effort across space in a sophisticated fashion. One
member of the coop was designated the fleet director and was provided real time in-
formation on stock concentrations at all locations while the harvest was taking
place. This individual then directed effort over the fishing grounds to avoid opportu-
nistic races to catch fish at privately advantageous locations or times. Late in 2002,
members of both groups were surveyed. Those in the cooperative reported signifi-
cant financial advantages from cooperation, from decreased harvest costs and
increased product quality. Most coop members found the fishing experience to be
less competitive and more enjoyable.5
Geoduck Fishery of British Columbia. The Geoduck is the largest bivalve in North
America with an average size of 2 pounds, and a maximum size of about 14 pounds.
The fishery is managed via spatially inexplicit individual license quotas. Partly to
capitalize on other margins of profitability, industry participants formed a coopera-
tive called the Underwater Harvester’s Association (UHA) in 1981.6 The UHA now
participates in co-management with the Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans. As such, the UHA collaborates on stock assessments, enhancement projects,
labeling, and management plans. This arrangement is widely recognized as an eco-
nomic success story that would not have been possible without the coordination of
the UHA cooperative.
Fishing Cooperatives of Baja California, Mexico. Many small, remote fishing com-
munities on the Pacific coast of Baja California, Mexico, have secured exclusive
access to harvest in particular areas of ocean from the federal government. The most
economically important species are small pelagic fish, lobster, and abalone. The co-
operatives are responsible for drafting their own fishery management plan, as well
as for monitoring and enforcement, all nested within a federal fisheries management
framework. Annual quotas have been augmented with a system-wide cooperative ef-
fort. For example, the nine cooperatives of the Vizcaino Peninsula organized into a
federation (Fedecoop) to coordinate harvest and processing to increase profits. One
function of the cooperative is to share information on harvest, thus reducing search
costs.
“Ambushi” Fishermen of Okinawa, Japan. Stake netting (“Ambushi”) fishermen in
Japan have a complex community structure that provides for exclusive access to par-
ticular fishing grounds, where more senior members have secured access to the most
4 The formula allocated $63,000 to fishing members and $23,000 to non-fishing members.
5 A subsequent court ruling found this arrangement to be illegal, and it was subsequently banned in
Alaska. The court ruled that it is illegal for a harvester to profit from a right to fish if the individual
does not actually engage in fishing.
6 See www.geoduck.org/index_2.html Thanks are due to an anonymous referee for pointing us to this
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profitable grounds. The coordination problem is solved by an elaborate system
where a senior fisherman calls a meeting of all fishermen to discuss use rights, new
fishing locations, and the spatial distribution of harvest (Akimichi 1984). Oral histo-
ries reveal a complex tenure system meant to internalize spatial and temporal
externalities and thereby avoid cost-increasing behavior that would result without
coordination (Akimichi 1984).
“Shiroebi” Shrimp Fishermen of Toyama Bay, Japan. Two groups of fishermen har-
vest shiroebi (Japanese glass shrimp) from Toyama Bay under very different
institutional structures (Gaspart and Seki 2003). For over 40 years one group, a co-
operative, has shared both revenues and costs. Members of a second group, which
was granted access to the fishery in 1992, operate independently. The two groups
share access to the stock during part of the year by fishing on alternating days of the
week. Both groups use the same harbor facilities, fish the same waters, and harvest
the same species. Members of the cooperative group share information with one an-
other, by radio, on productive fishing locations.7 The independent harvesters tend to
conceal information from one another. The cooperative group also coordinates ac-
cess among members to productive fishing spots. Controlling for differences in the
experience levels of skipper and crew as well as boat size, catch per day is signifi-
cantly higher for members of the cooperative group than for the other group.
New Zealand paua. The paua (abalone) is a univalve shellfish found in the rocky
coastal areas of New Zealand. Since 1986 it has been managed under New Zealand’s
ITQ quota management system. Since 2004 a commercial stakeholder group consist-
ing of harvesters operating near Christchurch has collaborated on a voluntary effort
to coordinate effort among harvesters. A key component of the group’s harvesting
plan for this region is a policy of managing effort spatially, in order to direct effort
away from certain highly accessible areas that tend to be overfished and toward less
heavily exploited areas. The group also cooperates by sharing information on diving
conditions and stocks, efforts to reseed depleted grounds, and controlling poaching.
In addition, this group has proposed a diver accreditation plan, intended in part to
reduce incidental harvesting mortality, and has implemented voluntary size limits in
certain areas.8
We have also found less detailed evidence for the potential gains from coopera-
tion from descriptions of individual fisheries. Wilen’s (2002) account of experience
in the Bering Sea pollock fishery after the formation of cooperatives in 1998 points
to the presence of potentially important heterogeneity. The roe content of female
pollock, and hence their unit value, varies over time during the season and even var-
ies according to position within a migrating mass of fish. Our analysis suggests that
a simple ITQ policy would not fully capture the rents from harvesting this species,
whereas an agreement to coordinate fishing dates and locations among fishermen
might.
Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang (1994) report on the role that cooperative organi-
zations play around the world in managing fisheries. They report that rules limiting
7 The cooperative group cooperates in other ways as well, by sharing expertise, searching for lost equip-
ment, and jointly investigating new fishing methods (Lynham 2006). According to Gaspart and Seki
(2003), the cooperative shiroebi fishermen escape the free-rider problem one might expect to accom-
pany their financial sharing arrangement because all members place great value on the prestige that
comes with being a highly productive harvester.
8 See www.seafood.co.nz/doclibrary/industryorgs/paua We are grateful to Tom McClurg for bringing this
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competition for the best fishing spots; e.g., by specifying a strict order in which an
area can be fished or time slots during which specific individuals are allowed to use
a given spot, are among the most common kinds of agreements reached. Rules gov-
erning the size of fish taken and periods during the year when fish can be taken are
also common. Hannesson (1988) describes assignment rules in Turkish fisheries that
limit competition for use of the best fishing grounds. More generally, he notes that
spatial rules apparently serve to mitigate spatial competition and to ration access to
spots where fish are easily accessible due to migratory patterns. A policy that simply
assigns rights to harvest undifferentiated portions of the stock; e.g., tons of biomass,
cannot accomplish the coordination evident in these rules.
Finally, there is extensive anthropological evidence on information sharing
among groups of fishermen. Gatewood (1984) reports that small groups of purse
seine skippers in inland salmon fisheries in southeast Alaska often meet to negotiate
sharing information on stock locations. Each participant searches an agreed upon
area a day or two before the opening. The afternoon before the opening, they meet
again to share information. Such groups are often based on kinship ties; members
must be relied on to provide honest information and not to leak information to out-
siders. These cooperative efforts are particularly valuable because salmon
movements are unpredictable in the short run and only up-to-the minute information
is valuable before openings.
Conclusions
Our central message echoes a conclusion from Wilen (2002) that the rents fisheries
can generate are complex, and their levels are determined by interactions among
fishermen along several dimensions. The seminal open-access model of Gordon
(1954) seemed to suggest, incorrectly, that full rent capture could be achieved by
limiting fishing ‘effort.’ Shifting attention toward pricing the unowned biomass, as
with ITQs, has brought enormous gains. As we argue here, however, the biomass it-
self may be complex and multidimensional, and its economic value may vary across
space and time. When this is the case, no single scarcity price or simple assignment
of undifferentiated rights to harvest can capture all the rent the resource is capable
of generating. Any single price will leave room for individual agents to compete to
harvest stocks under the most advantageous circumstances. Accordingly, when a
single price policy, such as an ITQ, is used to manage a multidimensional resource,
there will be opportunities to improve on the resulting allocation by adapting the
policy to recognize resource heterogeneity. Our analysis suggests that such improve-
ments may come from making more precise delineations of harvest rights or from
coordinating effort to avoid wasteful competition and duplication.
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